Competition between adaptive agents: from learning to collective efficiency and back

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dc.creatorChallet, Damien
dc.date2002-10-15
dc.date2003-07-21
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T02:47:44Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T02:47:44Z
dc.descriptionWe use the Minority Game and some of its variants to show how efficiency depends on learning in models of agents competing for limited resources. Exact results from statistical physics give a clear understanding of the phenomenology, and opens the way to the study of reverse problems. What agents can optimize and how well is discussed in details.
dc.description17 pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0210319
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0210319
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/20123
dc.subjectCondensed Matter
dc.titleCompetition between adaptive agents: from learning to collective efficiency and back
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