Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies

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dc.creatorGomez-Gardenes, J.
dc.creatorCampillo, M.
dc.creatorFloria, L. M.
dc.creatorMoreno, Y.
dc.date2006-12-12
dc.date2007-03-08
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:50:41Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:50:41Z
dc.descriptionIn this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the population is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate ({\em pure cooperators}), always defect ({\em pure defectors}) and those that intermittently change their strategy. In fact the size of the latter set is the biggest for a wide range of the "stimulus to defect" parameter. While in homogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters, in heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster containing the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further insights into why cooperation in SF networks is favored.
dc.description4 pages and 4 figures. Final version as published in Physical Review Letters
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612108
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612108
dc.identifierPhysical Review Letters 98, 108103 (2007)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.108103
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/125245
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.titleDynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
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