Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

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dc.creatorEriksson, Kimmo
dc.creatorKarlander, Johan
dc.date1998-01-21
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:23:38Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:23:38Z
dc.descriptionIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.
dc.description21 pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/9801096
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/9801096
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/76519
dc.subjectCombinatorics
dc.subject90D06; 90C27
dc.titleStable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
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