Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under IC behaviour

Simple item page
dc.creatorPritchard, Geoffrey
dc.creatorWilson, Mark C.
dc.date2007-02-25
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:48:49Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:48:49Z
dc.descriptionWe consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be recruited to form a manipulating coalition. It is shown that the manipulation problem may be well approximated by a very simple linear program in two variables. This permits a comparative analysis of the asymptotic (large-population) manipulability of the various rules. It is seen that the manipulation resistance of positional rules with 5 or 6 (or more) candidates is quite different from the more commonly analyzed 3- and 4-candidate cases.
dc.description20 pages, submitted to Journal of Economic Theory
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0702752
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0702752
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/124633
dc.subjectProbability
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.subject91B12
dc.titleAsymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under IC behaviour
dc.typetext

Files

Collections

arXiv