Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems

Simple item page
dc.creatorLahiri, Somdeb
dc.date2004-01-16
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:04:36Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:04:36Z
dc.descriptionIn this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper: cooperative stability and non-cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set.
dc.description14 pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0401199
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0401199
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/69871
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.subjectCombinatorics
dc.titleStable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems
dc.typetext

Files

Collections

arXiv