Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games

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dc.creatorIqbal, A.
dc.creatorToor, A. H.
dc.date2001-06-09
dc.date2004-07-06
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T06:02:14Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T06:02:14Z
dc.descriptionIn bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.
dc.description8 pages, no figure, to appear in Communications in Theoretical Physics
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106056
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106056
dc.identifierCommunications in Theoretical Physics. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp 335-338, 2004
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/89534
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.subjectAdaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
dc.titleStability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games
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