Dynamics of Strategic Three-Choice Voting

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dc.creatorVolovik, D.
dc.creatorMobilia, M.
dc.creatorRedner, S.
dc.date2008-12-08
dc.date2009-02-27
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:49:46Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:49:46Z
dc.descriptionIn certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideologically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties that frequently exchange majority status and a third party that is almost always in the minority.
dc.description6 pages, 4 figures. Version 2: reference added. Version 3: final version
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0812.1296
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0812.1296
dc.identifierEPL (Europhysics Letters) Vol. 85, 48003 (2009)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/222486
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.subjectStatistical Mechanics
dc.subjectAdaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
dc.subjectGeneral Physics
dc.titleDynamics of Strategic Three-Choice Voting
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