Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?

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dc.creatorViossat, Yannick
dc.date2009-02-16
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:42:20Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:42:20Z
dc.descriptionWe investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true of Nash equilibrium for n>2. The crucial lemma is that a unique correlated equilibrium is a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium. Related results are studied. For instance, we show that generic two-person zero-sum games have a unique correlated equilibrium and that, while the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is not open, the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique and quasi-strict symmetric Nash equilibrium is.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2771
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2771
dc.identifierJournal of Mathematical Economics 44, 11 (2008) 1152-1160
dc.identifierdoi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.06.008
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/220041
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.subject91A10
dc.titleIs Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?
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