On the Utility of Anonymized Flow Traces for Anomaly Detection
| dc.creator | Burkhart, Martin | |
| dc.creator | Brauckhoff, Daniela | |
| dc.creator | May, Martin | |
| dc.date | 2008-10-09 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T10:08:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T10:08:46Z | |
| dc.description | The sharing of network traces is an important prerequisite for the development and evaluation of efficient anomaly detection mechanisms. Unfortunately, privacy concerns and data protection laws prevent network operators from sharing these data. Anonymization is a promising solution in this context; however, it is unclear if the sanitization of data preserves the traffic characteristics or introduces artifacts that may falsify traffic analysis results. In this paper, we examine the utility of anonymized flow traces for anomaly detection. We quantitatively evaluate the impact of IP address anonymization, namely variations of permutation and truncation, on the detectability of large-scale anomalies. Specifically, we analyze three weeks of un-sampled and non-anonymized network traces from a medium-sized backbone network. We find that all anonymization techniques, except prefix-preserving permutation, degrade the utility of data for anomaly detection. We show that the degree of degradation depends to a large extent on the nature and mix of anomalies present in a trace. Moreover, we present a case study that illustrates how traffic characteristics of individual hosts are distorted by anonymization. | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0810.1655 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.1655 | |
| dc.identifier | Proceedings of the 19th ITC Specialist Seminar on Network Usage and Traffic (ITC SS 19), October 2008, Berlin, Germany | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/171110 | |
| dc.subject | Networking and Internet Architecture | |
| dc.title | On the Utility of Anonymized Flow Traces for Anomaly Detection | |
| dc.type | text |