Evolutionary snowdrift game with loners
| dc.creator | Zhong, Li-Xin | |
| dc.creator | Zheng, Da-Fang | |
| dc.creator | Zheng, B. | |
| dc.creator | Xu, Chen | |
| dc.creator | Hui, P. M. | |
| dc.date | 2006-05-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T07:14:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T07:14:52Z | |
| dc.description | The effects of an additional strategy or character called loner in the snowdrift game are studied in a well-mixed population or fully-connected network and in a square lattice. The snowdrift game, which is a possible alternative to the prisoner's dilemma game in studying cooperative phenomena in competing populations, consists of two types of strategies, C (cooperators) and D (defectors). In a fully-connected network, it is found that either C lives with D or the loners take over the whole population. In a square lattice, three possible situations are found: a uniform C-population, C lives with D, and the coexistence of all three characters. The presence of loners is found to enhance cooperation in a square lattice by enhancing the payoff of cooperators. The results are discussed in terms of the effects in restricting a player to compete only with his nearest neighbors in a square lattice, as opposed to competing with all players in a fully-connected network. | |
| dc.description | 7 pages, including 6 figures | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0605010 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0605010 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/113060 | |
| dc.subject | Physics and Society | |
| dc.title | Evolutionary snowdrift game with loners | |
| dc.type | text |