Two-Point Attack on the Two Nonorthogonal State QKD Protocol over a Fiber-Optic Channel
| dc.creator | Yang, Li | |
| dc.creator | Wu, Ling-An | |
| dc.date | 2003-10-12 | |
| dc.date | 2003-10-23 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:08:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:08:04Z | |
| dc.description | We suggest here a two-point eavesdropping strategy to two nonorthogonal states protocol of quantum key distribution over a fiber-optic channel. Suppose that the single-photon sources and detectors of Alice, Bob and Eves are ideal ones, the two-point attack can break the two nonorthogonal states protocol if the distance between Alice and Bob is sufficiently long. For single-photon type B92 protocol, the upper bound of distance is about 30 kilometers. It is interesting that Bennett's original multi-photon protocol is secure against both two-point attack and beam splitting attack, even if the protocol is realized with weak pulse source. | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310080 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310080 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/91508 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Two-Point Attack on the Two Nonorthogonal State QKD Protocol over a Fiber-Optic Channel | |
| dc.type | text |