Efficiency and formalism of quantum games

dc.creatorLee, Chiu Fan
dc.creatorJohnson, Neil
dc.date2002-07-02
dc.date2008-09-19
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T10:03:49Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T10:03:49Z
dc.descriptionWe pursue a general theory of quantum games. We show that quantum games are more efficient than classical games, and provide a saturated upper bound for this efficiency. We demonstrate that the set of finite classical games is a strict subset of the set of finite quantum games. We also deduce the quantum version of the Minimax Theorem and the Nash Equilibrium Theorem.
dc.description10 pages. Efficiency is explicitly defined. More discussion on the connection of quantum and classical games
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207012
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0207012
dc.identifierPhys. Rev. A 67, 022311 (2003)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevA.67.022311
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/169434
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleEfficiency and formalism of quantum games
dc.typetext

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