Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

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dc.creatorApt, Krzysztof R.
dc.date2007-06-07
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:04:29Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:04:29Z
dc.descriptionWe provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and applies both to the notions of rationalizability and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
dc.description8 pages Proc. of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XI), 2007. To appear
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0706.1001
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0706.1001
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/129977
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.subjectArtificial Intelligence
dc.titleEpistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
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