Evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations

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dc.creatorWang, Jing
dc.creatorFu, Feng
dc.creatorWang, Long
dc.creatorXie, Guangming
dc.date2007-01-29
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:43:41Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:43:41Z
dc.descriptionWe propose a model for evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies $A$, $B$ and $C$ in the framework of Moran process in finite populations. The model can be described as a stochastic process which can be numerically computed from a system of linear equations. Furthermore, to capture the feature of the evolutionary process, we define two essential variables, the {\em global} and the {\em local} fixation probability. If the {\em global} fixation probability of strategy $A$ exceeds the neutral fixation probability, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ no matter what the initial ratio of $B$ to $C$ is. Similarly, if the {\em local} fixation probability of $A$ exceeds the neutral one, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ only in some appropriate initial ratios of $B$ to $C$. Besides, using our model, the famous game with AllC, AllD and TFT is analyzed. Meanwhile, we find that a single individual TFT could invade the entire population under proper conditions.
dc.descriptionFixation probability calculation for 3-player games
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701315
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701315
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/122925
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.titleEvolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations
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