Derivation of evolutionary payoffs from observable behavior
| dc.creator | Feigel, Alexander | |
| dc.creator | Englander, Avraham | |
| dc.creator | Engel, Assaf | |
| dc.date | 2008-09-06 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T10:01:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T10:01:16Z | |
| dc.description | Interpretation of animal behavior, especially as cooperative or selfish, is a challenge for evolutionary theory. Strategy of a competition should follow from corresponding Darwinian payoffs for the available behavioral options. The payoffs and decision making processes, however, are difficult to observe and quantify. Here we present a general method for the derivation of evolutionary payoffs from observable statistics of interactions. The method is applied to combat of male bowl and doily spiders, to predator inspection by sticklebacks and to territorial defense by lions, demonstrating animal behavior as a new type of game theoretical equilibrium. Games animals play may be derived unequivocally from their observable behavior, the reconstruction, however, can be subjected to fundamental limitations due to our inability to observe all information exchange mechanisms (communication). | |
| dc.description | 9 pages, 3 figures | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0809.1138 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0809.1138 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/168574 | |
| dc.subject | Populations and Evolution | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.subject | Physics and Society | |
| dc.title | Derivation of evolutionary payoffs from observable behavior | |
| dc.type | text |