Classical Knowledge for Quantum Security
| dc.creator | D'Hondt, Ellie | |
| dc.creator | Sadrzadeh, Mehrnoosh | |
| dc.date | 2008-08-26 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T09:58:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T09:58:38Z | |
| dc.description | We propose a decision procedure for analysing security of quantum cryptographic protocols, combining a classical algebraic rewrite system for knowledge with an operational semantics for quantum distributed computing. As a test case, we use our procedure to reason about security properties of a recently developed quantum secret sharing protocol that uses graph states. We analyze three different scenarios based on the safety assumptions of the classical and quantum channels and discover the path of an attack in the presence of an adversary. The epistemic analysis that leads to this and similar types of attacks is purely based on our classical notion of knowledge. | |
| dc.description | extended abstract, 13 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.3574 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0808.3574 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/167787 | |
| dc.subject | Cryptography and Security | |
| dc.subject | Logic in Computer Science | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Classical Knowledge for Quantum Security | |
| dc.type | text |