Evolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network

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dc.creatorLuthi, L.
dc.creatorPestelacci, E.
dc.creatorTomassini, M.
dc.date2007-06-01
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:03:50Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:03:50Z
dc.descriptionWe simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.
dc.description13 pages, 9 figures; to be published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2007
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0706.0100
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0706.0100
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/129729
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.titleEvolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network
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