Device-independent security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks
| dc.creator | Acin, Antonio | |
| dc.creator | Brunner, Nicolas | |
| dc.creator | Gisin, Nicolas | |
| dc.creator | Massar, Serge | |
| dc.creator | Pironio, Stefano | |
| dc.creator | Scarani, Valerio | |
| dc.date | 2007-02-15 | |
| dc.date | 2007-06-25 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T08:37:27Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T08:37:27Z | |
| dc.description | We present the optimal collective attack on a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol in the "device-independent" security scenario, where no assumptions are made about the way the QKD devices work or on what quantum system they operate. Our main result is a tight bound on the Holevo information between one of the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality. | |
| dc.description | 5 pages, 1 figure. v2: minor modifications | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702152 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702152 | |
| dc.identifier | Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007) | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.230501 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/140406 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Device-independent security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks | |
| dc.type | text |