Observational Consequences of Many-Worlds Quantum Theory
| dc.creator | Page, Don N. | |
| dc.date | 1999-04-01 | |
| dc.date | 1999-05-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:16:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:16:21Z | |
| dc.description | Contrary to an oft-made claim, there can be observational distinctions (say for the expansion of the universe or the cosmological constant) between "single-history" quantum theories and "many-worlds" quantum theories. The distinctions occur when the number of observers is not uniquely predicted by the theory. In single-history theories, each history is weighted simply by its quantum-mechanical probability, but in many-worlds theories in which random observations are considered, there should also be the weighting by the numbers or amounts of observations occurring in each history. | |
| dc.description | 8 pages, no figures, LaTeX. Messages from Jerry Finkelstein and Jacques Mallah have led me to realize that, although I stand by my prediction that in a many-worlds theory you will be alive in the year 2100 in some worlds, paradoxically the evidence you will have then will not support many-worlds quantum theory over single-history quantum theory, since in either theory it will be evidence of very low measure and likelihood for a random observation. Therefore, I deleted this part of the paper (and shortened other parts) | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9904004 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9904004 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/94035 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.subject | General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology | |
| dc.subject | High Energy Physics - Theory | |
| dc.title | Observational Consequences of Many-Worlds Quantum Theory | |
| dc.type | text |