Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference

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dc.creatorMayo, Deborah G.
dc.creatorCox, D. R.
dc.date2006-10-27
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:08:17Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:08:17Z
dc.descriptionAfter some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of $p$-values rather than as formal procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of $p$-values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of more complicated situations are discussed in which modification of the simple $p$-value may be essential.
dc.descriptionPublished at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/074921706000000400 in the IMS Lecture Notes--Monograph Series (http://www.imstat.org/publications/lecnotes.htm) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org)
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0610846
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0610846
dc.identifierIMS Lecture Notes--Monograph Series 2006, Vol. 49, 77-97
dc.identifierdoi:10.1214/074921706000000400
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/131216
dc.subjectStatistics Theory
dc.subject62B15, 62F03 (Primary)
dc.titleFrequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference
dc.typetext

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