Cooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors

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dc.creatorSzabo, Gyorgy
dc.creatorSzolnoki, Attila
dc.date2008-12-17
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:29:26Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:29:26Z
dc.descriptionWe study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy adoption from a randomly selected neighbor with a probability depending on the payoff difference and also on the type of the neighbor. The strategy adoption probability is reduced by a pre-factor ($w < 1$) from the players of type $B$. We consider the competition between two opposite effects when increasing the number of neighbors ($k=4$, 8, and 24). Within a range of the portion of influential players (type $A$) the inhomogeneous activity in strategy transfer yields a relevant increase (dependent on $w$) in the density of cooperators. The noise-dependence of this phenomenon is also discussed by evaluating phase diagrams.
dc.description4 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review E
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3244
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3244
dc.identifierPhys. Rev. E 79 (2009) 016106
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevE.79.016106
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/215875
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.subjectBiological Physics
dc.titleCooperation in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors
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