Quantum Key Distribution and String Oblivious Transfer in Noisy Channels
| dc.creator | Mayers, Dominic | |
| dc.date | 1996-06-04 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:13:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:13:52Z | |
| dc.description | We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol on a noisy channel against the most general attack allowed by quantum physics. We use the fact that in a previous paper we have reduced the proof of the unconditionally security of this QKD protocol to a proof that a corresponding Quantum String Oblivious Transfer (String-QOT) protocol would be unconditionally secure against Bob if implemented on top of an unconditionally secure bit commitment scheme. We prove a lemma that extends a security proof given by Yao for a (one bit) QOT protocol to this String-QOT protocol. This result and the reduction mentioned above implies the unconditional security of our QKD protocol despite our previous proof that unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes are impossible. | |
| dc.description | 15 pages, no figure, to be published at Crypto 96 | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9606003 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9606003 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/93256 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.title | Quantum Key Distribution and String Oblivious Transfer in Noisy Channels | |
| dc.type | text |