Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma in Random Graphs
Abstract
Description
We study an evolutionary version of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where the agents are placed in a random graph. For lattices with fixed connectivity, $α$, we show that for low values of $α$ the final density of cooperating agents depends on the initial conditions, while it does not depend for high connectivity lattices. We fully characterized the phase diagram of the system, using both, extensive numerical simulations and analytical computations. It is shown that two different behaviors are well defined: a Nash equilibrium one, where the density of cooperating agents $ρ_c$ is fixed, and a non-stationary one, where $ρ_c$ fluctuates in time. Moreover we study lattices with fluctuating connectivities and find that the phase diagram previously developed looses its meaning. In fact, multiple transitions appear and only one regime may be defined. This regime is completely characterized by a non stationary state where the density of cooperating agents varies in time.
10 pages, 14 figures
10 pages, 14 figures