Two-player nonZero-sum stopping games in discrete time

dc.creatorShmaya, Eran
dc.creatorSolan, Eilon
dc.date2004-10-06
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:12:59Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:12:59Z
dc.descriptionWe prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε>0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.
dc.descriptionPublished by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org) in the Annals of Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aop/) at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009117904000000162
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0410173
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0410173
dc.identifierAnnals of Probability 2004, Vol. 32, No. 3B, 2733-2764
dc.identifierdoi:10.1214/009117904000000162
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/72786
dc.subjectProbability
dc.subject60G40 (Primary) 91A15, 91A05. (Secondary)
dc.titleTwo-player nonZero-sum stopping games in discrete time
dc.typetext

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