Applications of LDPC Codes to the Wiretap Channel

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dc.creatorThangaraj, Andrew
dc.creatorDihidar, Souvik
dc.creatorCalderbank, A. R.
dc.creatorMcLaughlin, Steven
dc.creatorMerolla, Jean-Marc
dc.date2004-11-02
dc.date2007-01-29
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:15:16Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:15:16Z
dc.descriptionWith the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security can now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical error-correcting codes for both error correction (for the honest parties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model that corresponds to such a setting is the wire tap channel introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this paper, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for wire tap channels. We provide an alternative view of the proof for secrecy capacity of wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel and propose specific practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide security at rates below secrecy capacity. For the special case of a noiseless main channel and binary erasure channel, we consider encoder and decoder design for codes achieving secrecy on the wiretap channel; we show that it is possible to construct linear-time decodable secrecy codes based on LDPC codes that achieve secrecy.
dc.description30 pages, revised version
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0411003
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0411003
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/133394
dc.subjectInformation Theory
dc.subjectCryptography and Security
dc.titleApplications of LDPC Codes to the Wiretap Channel
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