Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games

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dc.creatorAndreescu, Titu
dc.creatorSunic, Zoran
dc.date2007-11-15
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:43:03Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:43:03Z
dc.descriptionA solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand coalition in all convex games and the tau-value encourages the grand coalitions in convex games up to three (but not more than three) players. Solution functions that encourage the grand coalition in convex games always produce allocations in the core, but the converse is not necessarily true.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0711.2334
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0711.2334
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/142180
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.subject91B32; 91B08; 91A12
dc.titleEncouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games
dc.typetext

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