The Nash-Equilibrium Requires Strong Cooperation

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dc.creatorRosinger, Elemer E
dc.date2005-07-01
dc.date2005-07-04
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:21:18Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:21:18Z
dc.descriptionContrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation assumption is simply unrealistic.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0507013
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0507013
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/75641
dc.subjectOptimization and Control
dc.titleThe Nash-Equilibrium Requires Strong Cooperation
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