On Penrose's square-root law and beyond
| dc.creator | Kirsch, Werner | |
| dc.date | 2006-11-14 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T07:32:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T07:32:53Z | |
| dc.description | In certain bodies, like the Council of the EU, the member states have a voting weight which depends on the population of the re- spective state. In this article we ask the question which voting weight guarantees a `fair' representation of the citizens in the union. The tra- ditional answer, the square-root law by Penrose, is that the weight of a state (more precisely: the voting power) should be proportional to the square-root of the population of this state. The square root law is based on the assumption that the voters in every state cast their vote inde- pendently of each other. In this paper we concentrate on cases where the independence assumption is not valid. | |
| dc.description | 19 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0611418 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0611418 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/119269 | |
| dc.subject | Probability | |
| dc.title | On Penrose's square-root law and beyond | |
| dc.type | text |