Is there a duality in the classical acceptance of non-constructive, foundational, concepts as axiomatic?
| dc.creator | Anand, Bhupinder Singh | |
| dc.date | 2003-04-21 | |
| dc.date | 2003-05-17 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T04:57:09Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T04:57:09Z | |
| dc.description | We consider a philosophical question that is implicit in Selmer Bringsjord's paper, "The narrational case against Church's Thesis": If, as Mendelson argues, the classically accepted definitions of foundational concepts such as "partial recursive function", "function", "(Tarskian) truth", "set" etc. are vague and imprecise - hence possibly non-constructive and intuitionistically objectionable - then replacing one non-constructive concept by another may be psychologically unappealing, but it should be meta-mathematically valid and acceptable. | |
| dc.description | v2; introduced standardised ACI compliant notation for citations; 11 pages; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/CTG_06_Consequences_Bringsjord.htm | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0304308 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0304308 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/67171 | |
| dc.subject | General Mathematics | |
| dc.subject | 03B10 | |
| dc.title | Is there a duality in the classical acceptance of non-constructive, foundational, concepts as axiomatic? | |
| dc.type | text |