On the Arrow property
| dc.creator | Shelah, Saharon | |
| dc.date | 2001-12-20 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T04:45:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T04:45:22Z | |
| dc.description | Let X be a finite set of alternatives. A choice function c is a mapping which assigns to nonempty subsets S of X an element c(S) of S. A rational choice function is one for which there is a linear ordering on the alternatives such that c(S) is the maximal element of S according to that ordering. Arrow's impossibility theorem asserts that under certain natural conditions, if there are at least three alternatives then every non-dictatorial social choice gives rise to a non-rational choice function. Gil Kalai asked if Arrow's theorem can be extended to the case when the individual choices are not rational but rather belong to an arbitrary non-trivial symmetric class of choice functions. The main theorem of this paper gives an affirmative answer in a very general setting. | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0112213 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0112213 | |
| dc.identifier | Adv. in Appl. Math. 34 No. 2 (2005) 217--251 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/62931 | |
| dc.subject | Logic | |
| dc.title | On the Arrow property | |
| dc.type | text |