Evolution of cooperation and communication skills as a consequence of environment fluctuations

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dc.creatorFeigel, Alex
dc.date2006-09-22
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:26:22Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:26:22Z
dc.descriptionDynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a series of different games, e.g as a consequence of environmental fluctuations, in order to develop social cooperation and communication skills. It differs from the general assumption that evolution of cooperation, the so called Cooperation Paradox, can be explained by a single set of rules for intra-population competitions. The developed methods, potentially, have a practical value for some learning optimization problems in multiagent, e.g. corporate, environment.
dc.descriptionDynamics of social systems, Decision theory and game theory
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0609034
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0609034
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/117051
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.subjectNeurons and Cognition
dc.titleEvolution of cooperation and communication skills as a consequence of environment fluctuations
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