Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols

Simple item page
dc.creatorMakarov, Vadim
dc.creatorSkaar, Johannes
dc.date2007-02-27
dc.date2007-11-23
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T09:29:30Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T09:29:30Z
dc.descriptionIn quantum cryptosystems, variations in detector efficiency can be exploited to stage a successful attack. This happens when the efficiencies of Bob's two detectors are different functions of a control parameter accessible to Eve (e.g., timing of the incoming pulses). It has previously been shown that the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is vulnerable to this attack. In this paper, we show that several other protocols and encodings may also be vulnerable. We consider a faked states attack in the case of a partial efficiency mismatch on the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol, and derive the quantum bit error rate as a function of detector efficiencies. Additionally, it is shown how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols.
dc.description9 pages, 2 tables, 5 figures; v3: rewritten for clarity, a few explanations and recent references added
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702262
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702262
dc.identifierQuant. Inf. Comp. 8, 0622 (2008)
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/157806
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleFaked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols
dc.typetext

Files

Collections

arXiv