Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems
| dc.creator | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
| dc.date | 2004-06-27 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T03:21:29Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T03:21:29Z | |
| dc.description | We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeild outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly Pareto Optimal for firms. Under additional assumptions: (a) given any two distinct workers, the set of yields acheivable by a firm with the first worker is disjoint from the set of yields acheivable by it with the second, and (b) the contract choice problem is pair-wise efficient, we prove that there is no stable outcome at which a firm can get more than what it gets at the unique outcome of our procedure. | |
| dc.description | 13 pages; source file: MS Word | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0406051 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0406051 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/32215 | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.title | Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems | |
| dc.type | text |