On Using Matching Theory to Understand P2P Network Design

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dc.creatorLebedev, Dmitry
dc.creatorMathieu, Fabien
dc.creatorViennot, Laurent
dc.creatorGai, Anh-Tuan
dc.creatorReynier, Julien
dc.creatorDe Montgolfier, Fabien
dc.date2006-12-21
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:36:33Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:36:33Z
dc.descriptionThis paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing P2P networks. We explore an evolution model derived from stable roommates theory that accounts for heterogeneity between nodes. We show that most P2P applications can be modeled using stable matching theory. This is the case whenever preference lists can be deduced from the exchange policy. In many cases, the preferences lists are characterized by an interesting acyclic property. We show that P2P networks with acyclic preferences possess a unique stable state with good convergence properties.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0612108
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0612108
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/120463
dc.subjectNetworking and Internet Architecture
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.titleOn Using Matching Theory to Understand P2P Network Design
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