Stochastic Limit-Average Games are in EXPTIME

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dc.creatorChatterjee, Krishnendu
dc.creatorMajumdar, Rupak
dc.creatorHenzinger, Thomas A.
dc.date2008-05-16
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:19:00Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:19:00Z
dc.descriptionThe value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within $ε$ in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in $\frac{1}ε$, for all $ε>0$.
dc.description15 Pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0805.2622
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0805.2622
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/212606
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.titleStochastic Limit-Average Games are in EXPTIME
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