Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies

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dc.creatorAntal, Tibor
dc.creatorTraulsen, Arne
dc.creatorOhtsuki, Hisashi
dc.creatorTarnita, Corina E.
dc.creatorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date2008-11-13
dc.date2009-03-19
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T13:15:10Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T13:15:10Z
dc.descriptionIn evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright-Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n*n games in the limit of weak selection.
dc.descriptionversion 2 is the final published version
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0811.2009
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0811.2009
dc.identifierJournal of Theoretical Biology 258, 614 (2009)
dc.identifierdoi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/230398
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.titleMutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
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