Enumerating the Nash equilibria of rank 1-games
| dc.creator | Theobald, Thorsten | |
| dc.date | 2007-09-09 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T08:28:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T08:28:26Z | |
| dc.description | A bimatrix game $(A,B)$ is called a game of rank $k$ if the rank of the matrix $A+B$ is at most $k$. We consider the problem of enumerating the Nash equilibria in (non-degenerate) games of rank 1. In particular, we show that even for games of rank 1 not all equilibria can be reached by a Lemke-Howson path and present a parametric simplex-type algorithm for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a non-degenerate game of rank 1. | |
| dc.description | 15 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0709.1263 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.1263 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/137616 | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.subject | Optimization and Control | |
| dc.title | Enumerating the Nash equilibria of rank 1-games | |
| dc.type | text |