Cryptanalysis of Yang-Wang-Chang's Password Authentication Scheme with Smart Cards

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dc.creatorPathan, Al-Sakib Khan
dc.creatorHong, Choong Seon
dc.date2008-04-08
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:18:11Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:18:11Z
dc.descriptionIn 2005, Yang, Wang, and Chang proposed an improved timestamp-based password authentication scheme in an attempt to overcome the flaws of Yang-Shieh_s legendary timestamp-based remote authentication scheme using smart cards. After analyzing the improved scheme proposed by Yang-Wang-Chang, we have found that their scheme is still insecure and vulnerable to four types of forgery attacks. Hence, in this paper, we prove that, their claim that their scheme is intractable is incorrect. Also, we show that even an attack based on Sun et al._s attack could be launched against their scheme which they claimed to resolve with their proposal.
dc.description3 Pages
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0804.1185
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0804.1185
dc.identifier10th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology (IEEE ICACT 2008), Volume III, February 17-20, 2008, Phoenix Park, Korea, pp. 1618-1620
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/212322
dc.subjectCryptography and Security
dc.titleCryptanalysis of Yang-Wang-Chang's Password Authentication Scheme with Smart Cards
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