Relative Strength of Strategy Elimination Procedures
| dc.creator | Apt, Krzysztof R. | |
| dc.date | 2007-06-12 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T08:05:13Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T08:05:13Z | |
| dc.description | We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based on a monotonic operator. To deal with this problem we use 'global' versions of these operators. | |
| dc.description | 8 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0706.1617 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0706.1617 | |
| dc.identifier | Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, no. 21, pp. 1-9 (2007) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/130211 | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.title | Relative Strength of Strategy Elimination Procedures | |
| dc.type | text |