Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs

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dc.creatorHalpern, Joseph Y.
dc.creatorMoses, Yoram
dc.date2006-10-16
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:27:52Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:27:52Z
dc.descriptionWe show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution concepts are implementations of two knowledge-based programs, one appropriate for games represented in normal form, the other for games represented in extensive form. These knowledge-based programs can be viewed as embodying rationality. The representation works even if (a) information sets do not capture an agent's knowledge, (b) uncertainty is not represented by probability, or (c) the underlying game is not common knowledge.
dc.descriptionTo appear, IJCAI 2007
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0610098
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0610098
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/117532
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.subjectDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
dc.subjectMultiagent Systems
dc.titleCharacterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs
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