Network dependence of strong reciprocity
| dc.creator | Mendes, R. Vilela | |
| dc.date | 2003-07-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:34:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:34:03Z | |
| dc.description | Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Oeconomicus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic punishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish norm violators at a cost to himself. For a population with small autonomous groups with collective monitoring, the interplay of intra- and intergroup dynamics shows this to be an adaptive trait, although not fully invasive of a selfish population. However, the absence of collective monitoring in a larger society changes the evolution dynamics. Clustering seems to be the network parameter that controls maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait. | |
| dc.description | 14 pages Latex | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0307003 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0307003 | |
| dc.identifier | Advances in Complex Systems 7 (2004) 357-368 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/99399 | |
| dc.subject | Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems | |
| dc.title | Network dependence of strong reciprocity | |
| dc.type | text |