Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria

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dc.creatorViossat, Yannick
dc.date2009-02-11
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:40:41Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:40:41Z
dc.descriptionWe show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/0902.1964
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/0902.1964
dc.identifierMathematical Social Sciences 56, 1 (2008) 27-43
dc.identifierdoi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/219517
dc.subjectDynamical Systems
dc.subject91A22
dc.titleEvolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria
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