Equilibria of Replicator Dynamics in Quantum Games
| dc.creator | Iqbal, Azhar | |
| dc.creator | Toor, A. H. | |
| dc.date | 2001-06-24 | |
| dc.date | 2004-04-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T06:02:19Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T06:02:19Z | |
| dc.description | An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamics but not every attractor is an ESS. We search for a dynamic characterization of ESSs in quantum games and find that in certain asymmetric bi-matrix games evolutionary stability of attractors can change as the game switches between its two forms, one classical and the other quantum. | |
| dc.description | Revised in the light of referees' comments, submitted to Nuovo Cimento B | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106135 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106135 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/89563 | |
| dc.subject | Quantum Physics | |
| dc.subject | Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems | |
| dc.title | Equilibria of Replicator Dynamics in Quantum Games | |
| dc.type | text |