Detection of Antineutrinos for Non-Proliferation
| dc.creator | Nieto, Michael Martin | |
| dc.creator | Hayes, A. C. | |
| dc.creator | Teeter, Corinne M. | |
| dc.creator | Wilson, William B. | |
| dc.creator | Stanbro, William D. | |
| dc.date | 2003-09-09 | |
| dc.date | 2004-02-24 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T05:39:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T05:39:53Z | |
| dc.description | We discuss the feasibility of using the detection of electron antineutrinos produced in fission to monitor the time dependence of the plutonium content of nuclear power reactors. If practical such a scheme would allow world-wide, automated monitoring of reactors and, thereby, the detection of certain proliferation scenarios. For GW$_e$ power reactors the count rates and the sensitivity of the antineutrino spectrum (to the core burn-up) suggest that monitoring of the gross operational status of the reactor from outside the containment vessel is feasible. As the plutonium content builds up in a given burn cycle the total number of antineutrinos steadily drops and this variation is quite detectable, assuming fixed reactor power. The average antineutrino energy also steadily drops, and a measurement of this variation would be very useful to help off set uncertainties in the total reactor power. However, the expected change in the antineutrino signal from the diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of plutonium, which would typically require the diversion of as little as a single fuel assemblies in a GW$_e$ reactor, would be very difficult to detect. | |
| dc.description | 17 pages | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/nucl-th/0309018 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/nucl-th/0309018 | |
| dc.identifier | Nucl. Sci. Engin. 149 (2005) 270-276 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/82089 | |
| dc.subject | Nuclear Theory | |
| dc.title | Detection of Antineutrinos for Non-Proliferation | |
| dc.type | text |