Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

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dc.creatorShor, Peter W.
dc.creatorPreskill, John
dc.date2000-03-01
dc.date2000-05-12
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T12:33:19Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T12:33:19Z
dc.descriptionWe prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement-purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
dc.description5 pages, Latex, minor changes to improve clarity and fix typos
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0003004
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0003004
dc.identifierPhys.Rev.Lett.85:441-444,2000
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.441
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/217087
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleSimple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
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