Attrition Defenses for a Peer-to-Peer Digital Preservation System
| dc.creator | Giuli, T. J. | |
| dc.creator | Maniatis, Petros | |
| dc.creator | Baker, Mary | |
| dc.creator | Rosenthal, David S. H. | |
| dc.creator | Roussopoulos, Mema | |
| dc.date | 2004-05-28 | |
| dc.date | 2004-11-27 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T03:21:23Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T03:21:23Z | |
| dc.description | In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe several defenses for LOCKSS, a peer-to-peer digital preservation system, that help ensure that application-level attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, wide-spread, and prolonged to impair the system. | |
| dc.description | 14 pages, 8 figures. version 2: Reworked the paper according to reviews. Expanded the evaluation section with experiments with more AUs | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0405111 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0405111 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/32177 | |
| dc.subject | Cryptography and Security | |
| dc.subject | C.2.4; D.4.6 | |
| dc.title | Attrition Defenses for a Peer-to-Peer Digital Preservation System | |
| dc.type | text |