Eavesdropping Attack with Hong-Ou-Mandel Interferometer and Random Basis Shuffling in Quantum Key Distribution

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dc.creatorKim, Chil-Min
dc.creatorChoi, Yun Jin
dc.creatorPark, Young-Jai
dc.date2006-03-02
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T07:07:56Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T07:07:56Z
dc.descriptionWe introduce new sophisticated attacks with a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer against quantum key distribution (QKD) and propose a new QKD protocol grafted with random basis shuffling to block up those attacks. When the polarization basis is randomly and independently shuffled by sender and receiver, the new protocol can overcome the attacks even for not-so-weak coherent pulses. We estimate the number of photons to guarantee the security of the protocol.
dc.description5 pages and 1 figure
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0603013
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0603013
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/110577
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleEavesdropping Attack with Hong-Ou-Mandel Interferometer and Random Basis Shuffling in Quantum Key Distribution
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