A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority

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dc.creatorHaggstrom, Olle
dc.creatorKalai, Gil
dc.creatorMossel, Elchanan
dc.date2004-06-24
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:09:41Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:09:41Z
dc.descriptionConsider an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is $p>1/2$. Condorcet's Jury Theorem which he derived from the weak law of large numbers asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. The notion of influence of a voter or its voting power is relevant for extensions of the weak law of large numbers for voting rules which are more general than simple majority. In this paper we point out two different ways to extend the classical notions of voting power and influences to arbitrary probability distributions. The extension relevant to us is the ``effect'' of a voter, which is a weighted version of the correlation between the voter's vote and the election's outcomes. We prove an extension of the weak law of large numbers to weighted majority games when all individual effects are small and show that this result does not apply to any voting rule which is not based on weighted majority.
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/math/0406509
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/math/0406509
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/71671
dc.subjectProbability
dc.subjectCombinatorics
dc.titleA Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority
dc.typetext

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