Strategy bifurcation and spatial inhomogeneity in a simple model of competing sellers
Abstract
Description
We present a simple one-parameter model for spatially localised evolving agents competing for spatially localised resources. The model considers selling agents able to evolve their pricing strategy in competition for a fixed market. Despite its simplicity, the model displays extraordinarily rich behavior. In addition to ``cheap'' sellers pricing to cover their costs, ``expensive'' sellers spontaneously appear to exploit short-term favorable situations. These expensive sellers ``speciate'' into discrete price bands. As well as variety in pricing strategy, the ``cheap'' sellers evolve a strongly correlated spatial structure, which in turn creates niches for their expensive competitors. Thus an entire ecosystem of coexisting, discrete, symmetry-breaking strategies arises.
6 pages, 6 figures, epl2; 1 new figure, include nash equilibrium analysis, typo fixes
6 pages, 6 figures, epl2; 1 new figure, include nash equilibrium analysis, typo fixes