The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Entanglement 2: Application to Proof of Security for Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography

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dc.creatorReid, M. D.
dc.date2001-12-07
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T06:03:18Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T06:03:18Z
dc.descriptionIn a previous paper certain measurable criteria have been derived, that are sufficient to demonstrate the existence of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations for measurements with continuous variable outcomes. Here it is shown how such EPR criteria, which do not demand perfect EPR correlations, can be used to prove the extent of security for continuous variable quantum cryptographic schemes (in analogy to that proposed by Ekert) where Alice and Bob hope to construct a secure sequence of values from measurements performed on continuous-variable EPR-correlated fields sent from a distant source. It is proven that the demonstration of the EPR criterion on Alice's and Bob's joint statistics compels a necessary loss in the ability to infer the results shared by Alice and Bob, by measurements performed on any third channel potentially representing an eavesdropper (Eve). This result makes no assumption about the nature of the quantum source of the fields transmitted to Alice and Bob, except that the EPR correlations are observed at the final detector locations. In this way a means is provided to establish security in the presence of some loss and less than optimal correlation, and against any eavesdropping strategy employed by Eve prior to detection of the fields by Alice and Bob.
dc.description10 pages, 1 figure
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112039
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112039
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/89892
dc.subjectQuantum Physics
dc.titleThe Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Entanglement 2: Application to Proof of Security for Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography
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